Abstract-We quantify the value-at-risk of inter-vehicle collision and detachment for a class of platoons, which are governed by secondorder dynamics in presence of communication time-delay and exogenous stochastic noise. Closed-form expressions for the risk measures are obtained as functions of Laplacian eigen-spectrum as well as their fine explicit approximations using rational polynomial functions. We quantify several hard limits and fundamental tradeoffs among the risk measures, network connectivity, communication time-delay, and statistics of exogenous stochastic noise. Simultaneous presence of stochastic noise and time delay in a platoon imposes some idiosyncratic limitations on the behavior of collision and detachment risks, for instance, weakening (improving) network connectivity may result in lower (higher) levels of risk. Furthermore, a thorough risk analysis and comparison have been conducted for networks with specific graph topology. We support our theoretical findings via extensive simulations.
guarantee the following two group behaviors in steady-state: (i) pairwise difference between position variables converges to a prescribed distance, and (ii) the platoon of agents attain the same constant velocity. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . We identify two types of undesirable events, also referred to as systemic events. It is crucial to identify a systemic event where at least two consecutive vehicles collide and calculate its probability. We recall that a near-hit-region for two consecutive vehicles in platoon is an unsafe region in the state space of trajectories, where once there, vehicles may collide with a high probability. This local event may interrupt the platoon and render the state of the entire network to unsafe regions in the state space. Similarly, no two consecutive vehicles may stand off too remotely, as they may lose connectivity. Identifying and accounting for such systemic events become substantially challenging when platoon is subject to exogenous stochastic noise and communication time-delay.
Related Literature: Norm induced performance and robustness measures have been widely studies in the context of robust control [11] . Reference [12] gives an overview and a brief history of risksensitive stochastic optimal control and surveys various approaches to controller design as well as their relationships among each other. The control objective, in this context, is to synthesize a controller with satisfactory levels of performance in the presence of Gaussian disturbances. These methods face severe shortcomings when they are applied to stochastic dynamical networks. The resulting controllers usually require all-to-all communication and do not respect topology of the underlying communication layer [13] . Moreover, these controller design methods do not scale with network size.
The H2-norm has been recently utilized as a measure of performance and coherency for linear consensus networks (see [1] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [8] and references therein). One of the main advantages of using H2-norm is its elegant representation in terms of Laplacian spectrum that makes development of tractable and scalable network design algorithms possible [17] . An interesting interpretation of the H2 norm, in the context of platooning, is that it quantifies the ability of the entire platoon to withstand the effect of exogenous noise and remain a rigid body [1] . The effects of time-delay in consensus networks have been investigated in various disciplines such as, to name only a few, traffic networks, flocking, distributed optimal control design [1] , [18] , [19] , [6] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] . These works are mainly concerned with the problem of stability. Performance analysis and design of time-delay first-order linear consensus network using H2-norm is recently studied in [8] , [24] , [15] , [25] , [26] , [27] .
The Hardy-Schatten norms of a system measure macroscopic features of networks. For instance, in linear consensus networks, H2-norm measures coherency [1] and H∞-norm quantifies global connectivity [17] . However, these measures cannot scrutinize microscopic behaviors of networks. The focus of this paper is to inspect risk of inter-vehicle collision or detachment in the platoon of vehicles. We build upon existing notions of risk that are widely used in the context of financial systems [28] , [29] . In its rudimentary form, risk serves as a surrogate for uncertainty in stochastic models [30] . We utilize the notion of value-at-risk to measure the extend and occurrence level of a random undesirable event, with a certain confidence level, over a specified time period.
Our Contributions: Building upon our recent works on first order consensus systems [31] , [32] , [33] , we investigate aspects of fragility in the platooning model from a systemic risk perspective. In Section V, the value-at-risk measure is quantified to determine safety margins for the following two types of undesirable events: (i) inter-vehicle collision, and (ii) inter-vehicle detachment. For a single collision or detachment event, we obtain a closed-form expression of risk in terms of Laplacian spectrum in Section VI. In Section VII, tight lower and upper bounds in terms of risk of individual events are provided for risk of multiple (joint) events. We outline the computational difficulties of calculating explicit expressions for the risk measures in Section IX and provide a tractable method for their approximation using rational functions. In Section VIII, we prove that fundamental limits and tradeoffs emerge on the best achievable levels of risk, which are solely due to the presence of exogenous noise and communication timedelay. The best achievable values of risk (of inter-vehicle collision and detachment) are quantified. Furthermore, we show that strengthening (weakening) network connectivity results in higher (lower) levels of risk of inter-vehicle collision and detachment. Finally, in Section X, we apply our approximate formulas to calculate risk of platoons with complete, path, and cyclic communication topologies and show how to identify high-risk vehicles in such networks.
Risk analysis of the platooning problem in this paper differs significantly in almost every building block from our earlier works on first-order linear consensus networks [31] , [32] , [33] . First, the time-delayed second-order linear consensus networks are inherently more perplexed. Therefore, the stability conditions, that serve as cornerstone of our results, require fundamentally different analytic approach. Second, the nature of systemic events are different, which in turn, result in new risk formulas that do not lend themselves to explicit expressions in terms of Laplacian spectrum. The present paper is an outgrowth of its submitted conference version [34] in several different aspects. First, we extend our risk analysis to inter-vehicle detachment events as well as multiple systemic events. We propose a tractable rational function approximation scheme for evaluation of risk. Furthermore, we examine special communication topologies and present extra simulation examples. The manuscript also contains full proofs of all our technical results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The n-dimensional Euclidean space with elements z = [ z1, . . . , zn ]
T is denoted by R n , where R n + will denote the positive orthant of R n . We denote the vector of all ones by 1n. For every z1, z2 ∈ R n , we write z1 z2 if and only if z2 − z1 ∈ R n + . The set of standard Euclidean basis for R n is represented by {e1, . . . , en}. Algebraic Graph Theory: A weighted graph is defined by G = (V, E, w), where V is the set of nodes, E is the set of links (edges), and w : V × V → R+ is the weight function that assigns a nonnegative number to every link. Two nodes i, j ∈ V are directly connected if and only if (i, j) ∈ E. The set of nodes adjacent to i constitutes the neighborhood of node i that is denoted by Ni = j ∈ V (i, j) ∈ E . Assumption 1. Every graph G = (V, E, w) in the paper is connected. In addition for every i, j ∈ V, the following properties hold: (i) w(i, j) > 0 if and only if (i, j) ∈ E; (ii) w(i, j) = w(j, i), i.e., links are undirected; (iii) w(j, j) = 0, i.e., links are simple.
The Laplacian matrix of G is a n×n matrix L = [lij] with elements
where kij := w(i, j). Laplacian matrix of a graph is symmetric and positive semi-definite. Assumption 1 implies that the smallest Laplacian eigenvalue is zero with algebraic multiplicity one. The spectrum of L can be ordered as
The eigenvector of L corresponding to λ k is denoted by q k . By
We normalize the Laplacian eigenvectors such that Q becomes an orthogonal matrix, i.e.,
The total effective resistance of G is a popular metric of connectivity [35] that is characterized as [36] 
The smaller the value of ΞG, the stronger the connectivity of G.
Probability Theory: Let L 2 (R q ) be the set of all R q -valued random
T of a probability space (Ω, F, P) with
2 (R) with mean value µ and standard deviation σ is represented by y ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ). The error function erf(x) : R → (−1, 1) is defined as
which is invertible on its range. The complementary error function is defined as erfc(x) = 1 − erf(x). For analyzing stochastic differential equations, we use the standard differential formulation dξ t for a stochastic differential 1 .
Unless otherwise stated, proofs of all technical results are placed in the appendices.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Suppose that a finite number of vehicles V = {1, . . . , n} form a platoon along the horizontal axis. Vehicles are labeled in descending order, where the n'th vehicle is assumed to be the leader. The i'th vehicle's state is determined by [
is the position and v (i) is the velocity of vehicle i ∈ V. The i'th vehicle's state evolves in time according to the following stochastic differential equation
where u (i) t ∈ R is the control input at time t. The term gdξ (i) t represents a white noise generator affecting dynamics of the vehicle and models the uncertainty diffused in the system. It is assumed that noise acts on every vehicle additively and independent of the other vehicles' noises. The magnitude is scaled with a diffusion coefficient g = 0, which is assumed to be identical for all i ∈ V. The control objectives for the platoon are to guarantee the following two global behaviors: (i) pair-wise difference between position variables of every two consecutive vehicles converges to zero; and (ii) the platoon of vehicles attain the same constant velocity in steady state. It is known Fig. 1 . A schematic diagram of a vehicle platooning is shown, where each vehicle aims to travel in a constant velocity while preserving pre-specified distance d from its immediate neighbors. It is assumed that vehicles exchange their state information with their neighboring vehicles over a time-invariant communication graph in presence of noise and constant time-delay. that the following feedback control law can achieve these objectives
DLet us denote the communication graph of the platoon by G = (V, E, w), where V = {1, . . . , n}, (i, j) ∈ E iff kij > 0, and w(i, j) = kij for all i, j ∈ V. The feedback gains kij ≥ 0 are designed so that the resulting communication graph G with Laplacian matrix (1) 
T , and ξ t = [ξ
T , respectively 2 . By applying the feedback control law (5) to (4) and denoting d = d1n, the closed-loop dynamics can be cast as the following initial value problem:
for all t ≥ 0 and given deterministic initial functions φ
. Standard results in the theory of stochastic functional differential equations [37] guarantee that (6) generates a well-posed stochastic process {(xt, vt)} t≥−τ .
The problem is to quantify risk of systemic events as a function of communication graph G, time-delay, and statistics of noise. The systemic events are undesirable events that lead to greater (negative) impact on the global behavior of the platoon. We consider two types of systemic events: inter-vehicle collision, where two successive vehicles get too close to each other, and inter-vehicle detachment, where two successive vehicles distance themselves too far from their target distance d and lose connectivity 3 .
IV. STABILITY AND SOLUTION STATISTICS
We investigate stability of the unperturbed closed-loop network, i.e., when g = 0 in (6) . Then, we analyze the statistical properties of the solution of (6) when g = 0.
2 The stochastic process {ξ t } t≥0 with ξ t = ξ
3 This is practically relevant as vehicles are usually equipped with communication modules with limited range. 
for all i, j ∈ V and all initial functions φ
The eigen decomposition of Laplacian L = QΛQ T offers the following useful transformation
In this new coordinates, (6) transforms to
A. Exponential Stability of the Unperturbed System
Let us consider the set
It can be verified that there always exists a unique a in (0,
) to solve equation a sin(a) = s1 as long as s1 ∈ (0, π 2 ). Figure 3 illustrates geometry of S. Remark 2. The stability of (6) has been analyzed in [22] . Theorem 1 proposes alternative conditions that are more suitable for risk analysis of vehicle platooning.
B. Steady-State Statistics of Positions and Velocities
The differential equation (7) can be decomposed into twodimensional subsystems with state variables z
. . , n. We apply the variation of parameters formula for Itô calculus [37] to express the solution of the decoupled subsystems
According to the conditions of Theorem 1, the principal solution Φi(t) of the unperturbed system, see (26) , is exponentially decaying (stable) with respect to the consensus equilibrium. The vector rs = r(z
T depends on the initial functions and Bi = 01×n , q T i T . For each i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, the process z
is well-defined and as t → ∞ it converges in distribution to the bi-variate normal distributions N (0, Σ∞) (i) with covariance matrix
The steady-state statistics, which are free from the transient effects of initial functions, carry the effects of the persistent network features, i.e., the communication topology, time-delay, and statistics of the exogenous uncertainties. Explicit calculation of Σ
(i)
∞ is neither feasible nor useful. We are interested in studying events that are related to the relative distance between vehicles. We are thus only concerned with the marginal statistics of the above system, rather than the full state, i.e., the statistics of
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Lemma 1.
Suppose that conditions of Theorem 1 hold. Then,
for all i = 2, . . . , n, where f : S → R is defined as
The result implies that z
The function f is well-defined in the stability region S, however, it cannot be calculated in an explicit form. To address this challenge, we propose in Section IX an efficient rational approximation of function f .
V. VALUE-AT-RISK MEASURES
The standard deviation of a random variable in L 2 (R) is one the common ways to quantify the uncertainty level encapsulated in that random variable. The notion of risk provides a more comprehensive and meticulous way to measure uncertainty in a random variable. Risk measures are defined either in terms of moments of a random variable or its distribution [30] , [38] . In this work, we focus on the latter type of risk, known as value-at-risk measures 4 . These risk measures quantify the manner with which the uncertainty, nested in a random variable, steers its realization close to some undesirable range of values. Let us denote the set of undesirable values, which is also referred to as the set of systemic events, by U ⊂ R. Then, the higher the risk on a random variable, the more likely that random variable will approach U . Definition 2. Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space, y : Ω → R and U ⊂ R. The set of systemic events of y is ω ∈ Ω | y(ω) ∈ U ∈ F .
We will evaluate the risk of ω ∈ Ω | y(ω) ∈ U leveraging the distribution of y. The idea is to construct a set structure to measure the distance of y from U . Then, the risk of systemic events for y will be defined on the basis of this structure.
A. Value-at-Risk of Scalar Events
Suppose that it is desirable for random variable y ∈ L 2 (R) to stay away from the set U . Let us consider a collection of super-sets {U δ } δ∈R + of U with the following properties:
with property limn→∞ δn = ∞.
The collection {U δ } δ∈R + can be further shaped to cover a suitable vicinity of U . This vicinity plays the role of an alarm zone resulting in high values of risk as y approaches U . For some specific δ > 0, the occurrence of y ∈ U δ signifies that how close y can get to U in probability. The idea is implemented with the use of quantile functions on the systemic events of y. For a given parameter ε ∈ (0, 1), the risk measure Rε : F → R+ is defined by
The number ε is the cut-off value that characterizes the level of confidence on the systemic events. The smaller its value, the higher the confidence of the index Rε. Let us elaborate and interpret what typical values of Rε imply. The case Rε = 0 signifies that the probability of observing y dangerously close to U is less than ε.
We have Rε > 0 iff y ∈ U δ for some δ > 0 (in fact, δ > Rε) with probability greater than ε. The extreme case with Rε = ∞ means that the event that y is to be found in U comes with probability greater than ε. In addition to several interesting properties (see for instance [32] , [38] , [30] ), the risk index (10) is non-increasing with ε.
Proposition 1. Let ε1, ε2 ∈ (0, 1) and consider the set of undesirable values U together with the collection of supersets {U δ } δ∈R + that satisfy properties Π1 and Π2. Then,
The motivation for risk in terms of quantile functions (10) emanates from the fact that (6) admits stochastic dynamics with random variables in L 2 with tractable distributions. It is then desirable to monitor the stochastic volatility of desired observables w.r.t. to a specific subset of R.
B. Value-at-Risk of the Vector of Events
For the case of random vectors y ∈ L 2 (R q ), we first extend the notion of super-sets by considering the product set
T . Similar to the scalar case, each sequence U δ i δ i ∈R + is assumed to satisfy properties Π1
and Π2. The multi-dimensional extension of Definition 2 includes systemic events constructed through combination of set operations. One scenario, for example, is through the union operation
In this case, the associated risk measure becomes
A moment of reflection on (11) reveals that their calculation requires treating multivariable distributions. Unfortunately, these are rarely expressed in closed forms. A computationally efficient surrogate is the vector of scalar risks, which is defined as
where
The vector Rε is a collection of the scalar risk measures based on the individual distributions of y (i) for i = 1, . . . , q. In section VII, we revisit this part by formulating several vector of systemic events that are of interest to risk analysis of the platooning problem. Furthermore, we investigate their relations with the more computationally tractable vector Rε.
VI. RISK OF SINGLE SYSTEMIC EVENTS IN THE PLATOON
We consider systemic events of inter-vehicle collision and detachment between two successive vehicles in the platoon. Let us represent the relative position of vehicles i and i + 1 in steady-state by the random variable
where its statistics can be directly inferred from that of z, as the next result explains.
Theorem 2. Let the conditions of Theorem 1 hold. Then, the steadystate solution of (6) satisfies
We utilize the result of this theorem to calculate risk of inter-vehicle collision and detachment for two successive vehicles.
A. Inter-Vehicle Collision
In absence of noise and under the conditions of Theorem 1, the steady-state distance between two successive vehicles satisfy
< 0, then the collision has already occurred at some time prior to t. When x relative distance between two consecutive vehicles being in
In summary, we can use the steady-steady statistics and infer whether vehicles i and i + 1 have already collided or are dangerously close to each other if
The union of the two disjoint sets define the family of parameterized events
It is straightforward to verify that the collection {C δ } δ≥0 satisfies properties Π1 and Π2. Then, the associated risk measure is defined as
for confidence level ε ∈ (0, 1). In other words, R C,i ε is the safety margin below which the likelihood of a past collision or a new one to be developed is less than ε. The larger the value of risk, the higher the probability of the two vehicles being vulnerable to a collision. Theorem 3. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 1 hold. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the risk of inter-vehicle collision is
where σ 2 i is as in Theorem 2 and κε := erf
The two extreme values of R C,i ε are self-explanatory. In the unperturbed case, there is no risk of collision in the long run because asymptotic platooning is achieved exponentially fast. In this case, we have σi = 0, which implies R C,i ε = 0. When noise is present, we have σi > 0. For d large enough, vehicles lie far away from each other in expectation. Hence vehicle collision is unlikely to occur. Finally, when the standard deviation σi exceeds an ε-dependent cutoff, the value of risk is +∞ in the following sense: collision cannot be avoided with probability higher than 1 − ε for this range of σi's.
The curve of R
ε (σi) is graphically illustrated in Figure  4 . 5 We read R C,i ε as the risk of collision between vehicles i + 1 and i with confidence level ε. A similar notation is used for the detachment risk defined below.
B. Vehicle detachment
In practice, vehicles are equipped with onboard finite-range communication modules. The i'th vehicle can establish reliable communication with those vehicles whose positions lie in range (x , ad for some design parameter h > 0. Parameter h plays the same role as parameter c in the inter-vehicle collision scenario: the higher the value of h, the narrower the length of the alarm zone prior to experiencing detachment. Let us define the family of parameterized events
Similar to the collision super-sets, the collection {D δ } δ∈R + satisfies properties Π1 and Π2. The value-at-risk of communication detachment between vehicles i + 1 and i is defined as
for fixed confidence level ε ∈ (0, 1). Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 3, the closed-form expressions for the risk of platoon detachment is given by
, and σi is as in Theorem 2. Both collision and detachment scenarios are illustrated in figure 5.
VII. RISK OF MULTIPLE SYSTEMIC EVENTS IN THE PLATOON
We generalize results of the previous section by considering multiple collision and detachment events that involve more than two vehicles and may happen simultaneously. The idea is to define proper super-sets for random vectors y = y (1) , . . . , y (q) T , where
. . , q. In the following, several scenarios are considered.
By constructing the full conjunction of the individual events discussed in Section VI, we can formulate risk of simultaneous collision and detachment between some pairs of successive vehicles throughout the platoon via
The risk of simultaneous collision and detachment across the platoon 
is measured by
The calculation of either (17) or (18) in closed-form is mathematically intractable as it demands working with multi-variable normal random variables. Since obtaining an explicit expressions is not feasible, we rely on first-order approximations using the vector of individual surrogates as in (12) . Let us define the vectors of individual risks for collision and detachment as 
where is replaced by either C or D, and the risk of simultaneous collision and detachment of some of the vehicles satisfy
for εi ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy:
with being either C or D.
As it is discussed in the Appendix, this result relies on the Boole-Fréchet inequalities. These probability inequalities are the best possible estimates on unions and intersections of events for which nothing is known other than the probabilities of the corresponding individual events [39] . We remark that, unlike the case of global union of events in Theorem 4, there is no non-trivial lower limit for One can define more general scenarios by grouping the elements of y into classes of interest. Let P be a partition of the set {1, . . . , n−1} into mutually disjoint subsets P1, . . . , P |P| , where |P| denotes the cardinality of P. It follows that |P| k=1 P k = {1, . . . , n − 1}. This labeling classifies the elements of y into |P| groups. This notation allows to formulate the following class of risk measures
and
in which U δ i is either C δ i or D δ i . The risk measure (18) is a special case of (20) when |P| = 1, where (20) quantifies risk of at least one event in every group of the partition will experience a systemic event. Similarly, (17) is a special case of (21), where (21) measures likelihood of all members of at least one of the groups in the partition experiences a systemic event. The results of Theorem 4 and Proposition 1 can be combined to obtain bounds for (20) and (21) in terms of vector of individual risk measures (19) . The results of this section allow us to design low risk platoons by formulating multi-objective optimization problems using vector of individual risk measures.
VIII. FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS AND TRADE-OFFS
An engineer has almost no control over the communication timedelay and exogenous disturbances. In such situations, one can design optimal communication topologies to minimize the disruptive effect of such imperfections. Our goal is to explore inherent shortcomings in network design when the effects of neither noise nor time-delay can be neglected 6 Lemma 2. The marginal standard deviations σi, as in Theorem 2, satisfy the lower bound
6 All discussions in this and the following sections are focused on risk of inter-vehicle collision. Results on risk of detachment can be derived in a similar fashion. This result reveals that the variance of x i+1 − x i attains a hard lower bound that only depends on the strength of the diffusion g and the time-delay τ .
Theorem 5. There is an inherent fundamental limit on the best achievable values of risk of inter-vehicle collision in the platoon that is given by
According to this result, the systemic risk measure attains the trivial lower limit zero when σ * is less than or equal to the critical value
. If σ * lies in a specific set of values, the risk of collision can be minimized as a function of communication topology. These imply that one can design a low risk platoon by optimizing the underlying communication topology via adding new feedback loops (coupling links), sparsifying, or adjusting the exiting feedback gains. On the other extreme, risk of inter-vehicle collision becomes infinite (i.e., collision becomes inevidable) if σ * exceeds a safety cut-off value. In fact, we can characterize an inevitability condition as follows: the risk of collision between two consecutive vehicles is infinite for all platoons, independent of their communication topology, if
for all ε ∈ (0, 0.5).
The risk can be reduced by minimizing the marginal standard deviations σi up to a limit, which is characterized by Lemma 2, by adjusting the platoon's control parameters (i.e., feedback gains kij and β). According to Theorem 3 and Lemma 2, the Laplacian spectrum of a platoon with minimal risk must satisfy λ1 = 0, λj = 1 τ s 1 for j = 2 . . . , n, and β = 1 τ s 2
where s 1 and s 2 are determined through
Therefore, the optimal communication topology is a complete graph with link weights kij = bi (s2) b2(s2) b3(s2) b4(s2) Fig. 8 . Plots of coefficiens ai of As 2 (s1), and bi of Bs 2 (s1), as functions of s2.
that βτ ∈ (0, 1), the communication connectivity, which is specified using the total effective resistance (3), cannot be improved beyond some certain threshold according to inequality
where ϑ : (0, 1) → 0, is defined by
with g(x) = x sin(x) and f (x) = x cot x.
The smallest lower bound for (22) is achieved when β = 0, which in that case (22) becomes
Going beyond hard limits, we show that fundamental trade-offs emerge between risk and network connectivity. These trade-offs explain that for a non-trivial range of feedback gains, kij, improving connectivity, which results in decreasing ΞG, leads to higher levels of systemic risk. For a rigorous exposition of our results, we need to employ some new notations. Let us define
for every m ≥ 1, where f is given by (9) and ϑ by (23), as well as
in which σ * is the fundamental limit of σi as in Lemma 2. We also define the sequences {α risk and communication connectivity emerges as follows
The important outcome of Theorem 7 asserts that, for a nontrivial range of network parameters, the only way to maintain a safer (low-risk) network is through weakening the communication connectivity, e.g., by decreasing the feedback gains or sparsifying the communication graph. Equivalently, strengthening the connectivity, e.g., by increasing the feedback gains or adding new feedback loops or links, increases the risk of collision (and detachment) between the vehicles. The intrinsic trade-off between risk and communication connectivity is due to the combined effect of time-delay and noise.
We conclude this section by highlighting that all the fundamental limits and trade-offs disappears when time-delay is absent, i.e., strengthening the connectivity among the vehicles reduces chances of witnessing collision events in the platoon.
IX. APPROXIMATION FORMULAS FOR RISK
Calculating explicit closed-form solutions for delay differential equations is almost impossible. This is also true for the delay model of platoon (6) and its transition matrix Φ. It was shown that the covariance matrix Σ∞ depends on Φ as in (8) . In fact, obtaining an explicit expression for the solution of the unperturbed platoon heavily depends on the form of function f : S → R+ as in (9) . Although f (s1, s2) has a closed-form, it does not admit an explicit form. Consequently, the formulas in (14) and (16) are expressed in terms of improper integrals. This induces a computational burden that quickly becomes an issue as the number of vehicles in the platoon increases. Thus, it is desirable to find efficient approximations of f (s1, s2) over its domain S in order to reduce computational complexity of our proposed methodology. Our investigation reveals that the behavior of f (s1, s2), depending on its parameters, is similar to some non-trivial rational function for which the existing conventional approximation techniques (e.g., Legendre polynomials) are proven to be inefficient. In the following, we first propose a rational approximation for f (s1, s2) along with its relative error bound. The details of our derivations can be found in Appendix A. Then, this approximation is applied to obtain an efficient approximation of the risk measures.
We recall that f (s1, s2) diverges on the boundary of S for s2 = 0 where f meets its poles. On the x-axis, over which s2 = 0 and f is finite, the dynamics of the unperturbed platoon seize to satisfy Definition 1. Thus, we will approximate f in a compact subset of S that excludes any pole or degeneracy. We adopt a compact subset of S that is characterized by
, where s * is the solution of s * cot(s * ) = s2 for s2 ∈ [0.1, 0.9]. This subset is depicted in Figure 7 along with S. One can verify that s * cot(s * ) = s2 is invertible for s2 ∈ [0.1, 0.9] and it can be expressed as s * (s2). For s1, s2 ∈ S, we choose the following specific class of rational functionsf
in which the enumerators
are polynomials in s1 with real-valued coefficients that exclusively depend on s2. Functions ai and bi can not be expressed in closedforms. Some typical graphs of these functions are shown in Figures  8 . Figure 11 depicts the exact function f (s1, 0.5) and the rational approximationf (s1, 0.5) for s1 ∈ S together with the associated relative error. The relative error function
is plotted in Figure 9 for all s1, s2 ∈ S. Our extensive numerical experiments verifies that max s 1 ,s 2 ∈S η(s1, s2) = O(10 −4 ). Moreover, computational explorations suggest that S contains the minimum value off (s1, s2). This is a significant indication in favor of utilizing f as a computationally efficient surrogate in order to develop efficient algorithms for design of low-risk platoons.
In the final step, we utilize approximation (25) and arrive at a tight approximation of the risk measureR
provided (λjτ, βτ ) ∈ S for j = 2, . . . , n − 1.
X. EXAMPLES OF COMMUNICATION TOPOLOGIES
Using the results of the previous section, we obtain approximate closed-form expressions for the risk of systemic events in platoons with certain symmetric communication topologies. The marginal variance is evaluated for platoons with complete, path, and p-cycle communication graphs with uniform feedback gains, i.e., kij ≡ k. The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of these graphs can be obtained explicitly [35] , [40] . We restrict our attention to calculation of the marginal standard deviation of the relative distance between two successive vehicles. Through our analysis, it is possible to calculate the value-at-risk measures of the collision and detachment events for a given confidence level ε and set of parameters a, c, d and h.
A. The Complete Graph
The eigenvalues of a complete graph are: λ1 = 0 and λj = kn for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. For (knτ, βτ ) ∈ S, the marginal standard deviation for the complete graph topology is
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Using this quantity, one can easily calculate the value-at-risk measures. The first plot from left in Figure  10 illustrates σi as a function of time-delay τ , number of vehicles, network parameters g = 1, k = 0.3, and β = 0.1. We conclude that for small time-delay, larger ensembles of vehicles experience lower risk. For large value of τ , it appears that the smaller the ensemble, the safer the platoon.
B. The Path Graph
The path graph over n nodes has n − 1 edges of k weight. The j th eigenvalue is λj = 2k 1 − cos(π(j − 1)/n) with the corresponding eigenvectors q1 = 1 √ n 1 and qj = q
. Then, one can easily calculate the risk measures. The second plot in Figure 10 illustrates σi with respect to vehicle labels, where it is assumed that communication graph in all simulations is path with network parameters g = 1, k = 0.3, and β = 0.1. We conclude that the safest regions with lowest risk of collision or detachment are located in the two ends of the platoon. As we approach the center, the risk of collision or detachment will increase monotonically and reach its peak half way before it begins decreasing again. This implies that the vehicles in the middle of the platoon are more likely than the others to experience collision or detachment. It is observed that time-delay uniformly increases the risk across the platoon. 
C. The p-Cycle Graph
A platoon with a p-cycle communication graph is a network where each vehicle communicates with its p-immediate neighbors. The corresponding Laplacian matrix is a special type of circulant matrices whose eigen-structure is discussed in [40] . From [40] , it can be shown that λ1 = 0 and λj
for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. The marginal standard deviation of the distance between vehicles i+1 and i is σi = |g|τ
The third plot from left in Figure 10 is a graphic illustration of the marginal variance over a platoon with n = 101 vehicles as a function of parameter p ∈ [2, 50]. The network parameters are k = 0.0211, β = 1, τ = 0.5, and g = 1. For small value of p, i.e., for loosely connected platoons, the marginal variance, which is identical for all vehicles, is large. As connectivity enhances by increasing p, the platoon becomes less fragile to systemic events of collision and detachment. Finally, when p approaches the limit value 50, i.e., the complete graph topology, the eigenvalues approach the boundary of S and the platoon becomes unstable. The authors acknowledge that it is an unrealistic to have vehicles to communicate over a cycle graph as the first vehicle may not be able to communicate with the last. However, the p-cyclic graphs serves as a nice approximation for the p-path graph when n is large enough. For n 1, the p-cycle graph resembles a graph where every vehicle communicates with its p nearest neighbors from each side (front and behind).
XI. SIMULATIONS
We discuss three cases studies for platoons whose dynamics are governed by (6) . First, we show that how time-delay can steer a platoon to become more prone to risk and eventually instability. The second case study illustrates that how, in the presence of timedelay, deviating from the optimal graph topology increases the risk of systemic events. Finally, the third case examines how spatial localization of communication may affect the risk measures.
A. Risk Behavior w.r.t. Connectivity
We consider a platoon of n = 10 vehicles. The desired distance is set to d = 1, the scale between position and velocity alignment to β = 1/3, and the drift coefficient of noise to g = 2. The other parameters are c = 1 and ε = 0.01 for the collision events, and a = 2, h = 1, ε = 0.05 for the network detachment events. The desired relative distance between two successive vehicles i + 1 and i is 1. The vehicles are in collision when x 
B. Random Perturbations in Optimal Graphs
In this case study, we investigate how deviation from an optimal graph topology affects the risk of collision and detachment by considering a platoon with n = 10 vehicles. The network parameters are g = 1.5, τ = 0.1, d = 0.5, and β = 2.2. For the collision events, we have set c = 1.5 and a cut-off value ε = 0.05. For the detachment events, we have set a = 2, h = 3, and a cut-off value ε = 0.1. We recall from Section VIII that the optimal communication graph is the one with βτ ≈ 0.220 and λjτ ≈ 1.111 for j = 2, . . . , n. An optimal graph for our example is the complete graph with identical link weights k * ij = 1.111 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We generate random perturbation of the optimal topology by substituting feedback gain k * ij with new feedback gain k * ij + b · ξ, where ξ is a random variable that is uniformly distributed in (0, 1). Figure 12 illustrates the value of the elements of vectors R 
C. Spatially Decaying Topologies
In this case, we consider geometric graphs where all-to-all communication is allowed by enforcing the range of connectivity to decrease with distance. This class of communication graphs is very typical in wireless communication networks. Each vehicle broadcasts its message, where signal-to-noise ratio of the received signal by another vehicle decreases with distance between the two vehicles. We consider a platoon with n = 50 vehicles with usual ascending labels from 1 to 50. The receiver of the i'th vehicle collects the state information of the j'th vehicle with feedback gain kij = 1.5 e −γ|i−j| for some γ ≥ 0. The exponent γ is the spatial decay index or localization parameter. For small values of γ, the network topology approximates a complete graph. As γ increases, the effective communication range of vehicles becomes more localized. For large enough values of γ that preserve connectivity, the communication topology resembles the path graph. In Figure 13 , we illustrate R C 0.05 for different exponents and observe various transition of the risk profile. For small γ, the graph is heavily connected, which combined with the effect of time-delay results in increased risk values. The high risk vehicles are the ones in the middle. As γ increases, connectivity decreases and the platoon experiences lower risk of collision. It is remarkably interesting that the vehicles in the middle become very safe. For larger values of γ, the communication network keeps losing connectivity and risk of systemic events becomes more evident. The more susceptible vehicles for γ ≥ 0.85 are again the ones in the middle. As γ exceeds 1, the communication gets very localized. Since n is large, poor connectivity makes the platoon susceptible to noise, leading to infinite value of risk for many pairs of vehicles.
XII. DISCUSSION
We focused on collision or detachment events between vehicles in a platoon, where each vehicle is modeled as a double integrator subject to exogenous noise. The ensemble is controlled via a distributed consensus feedback control law that suffers from communication timedelay. We develop a risk oriented framework to assess the possibility of the systemic events. We characterized intrinsic interplay among the risk measures, network connectivity, time-delay, and statistics of the exogenous uncertainty. Our technical results are particularly useful to design low-risk platoons by optimizing topology of the underlying communication network. One of our future research directions is to develop efficient and scalable algorithms to design communication topologies for platoons by striking a balance among connectivity, performance, and risk of collision or detachment events.
The function f (s1, s2) in (9) plays an instrumental role in the actual calculation of risk. As it is not explicitly stated, we can approximate f (s1, s2) for s1 and s2 in a compact subset S of S, defined as:
where s * :
= s2, s2 ∈ [0.1, 0.9], and it is presented in Figure 7 , together with S. For s1, s2 ∈ S ⊂ S, we will construct a rational approximation of f (s1, s2). Our approach relies on ideas developed in [41] . Now, we see that for fixed s2 ∈ (0, 1) the function fs 2 (s1) = f (s1, s2) attains a pole at s1 = 0 of order 4 and a pole at s1 = s * = s * (s2) ∈ (0, π/2) of order 1. In fact, the collection of all poles s * (s2), s2 ∈ (0, 1) is the curved boundary of S. The zero poles lie along the vertical axis. For fixed s2 ∈ [0.1, 0.9] we recall s * = s * (s2) and consider the vector space Ts 2 spanned by the functions
The inner product g1, g2 = s * −0.05
for any g1, g2 ∈ Ts 2 , will be used to generate an orthonormal basis of Ts 2 following the Gram-Schmidt process. We arrive at
with the weights w k = w k (s2) = fs 2 , ψ Thus we can write P as
for α k that generally depend on s2 ∈ [0.1, 0.9]. The first two coefficients, α1 and α2 are illustrated in Figure 14 . Numerical explorations show that α k , k = 2, . . . , 7 attain constant values α2 ≈ −0.0742, α3 ≈ 0.0198, α4 ≈ −0.0036, α5 ≈ 0.0008, α6 ≈ −10 −4 , α7 ≈ 10 −6 . 7 We can discard the terms α5, α6, α7, for being of negligible magnitude and this yields f (s1, s2) = −0.0036s
.
Elementary algebra yields
The accuracy off (s1, s2) is validated numerically. The results are depicted in Figure 9 . The maximum relative error is of order 10 −4 . In view of Assumption 1 we have qi1 ≡ qj1, we conclude that the latter is yet another affine tranformation of a multivariate normal distribution, from which we deduce that x The last inequality is equivalent to the mutually exclusive cases:
ε ≥ 1 2 and ε < 1 2 and σi ≤ d κε √ 2 c − 1 c .
The union of these two cases, covers the first branch of (14) . On the other hand, 
Proof of Theorem 4:
The proof relies on the Boole-Fréchet inequalities:
8 : Let the collection of F-measurable events A1, . . . , Am. Then,
max 0,
Ai ≤ min i P(Ai) .
These inequalities are the best possible probability estimates of the events
Ai when nothing else is known, other than the individual probabilities P(Ai), i = 1, . . . , m . We will focus on global collision event risk as the steps on risk of global detachment are identical. Observe that (18) , can be cast as the solution of the chance constraint optimization problem minimize δ δ
subject to:
Consider the solutions {δ
of the scalar problems minimize δ i δi (33) subject to: P y (i) ∈ C δ i < ε,
In view of the right hand-side of (29), δ + = δ + 1 , . . . , δ + n−1 is, in fact, a feasible solution of (31)-(32) :
This establishes the upper bound of V. The lower bound of set V is trivial. We proceed with the second pair, for which we remark that is the solution of the following constraint optimization problem minimize δ δ
On the other hand, we can consider the solutions δ * 1 , . . . , δ * n−1 of the scalar problems minimize δ i δi subject to: P y (i) ∈ U δ i < εi, for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, and εi ∈ (0, 1) such that n−1 i=1 εi = ε. Using (29) we can show that δ * is a feasible solution of (35)- (36) . Indeed,
. On the other hand, if δ † is the optimal solution of (35)-(36), then P y (i) ∈ U δ † i < ε, i = 1, . . . , n − 1, by virtue of the left-hand side of (29) . Consequently, δ † k solve minimize δ k δ k subject to: P y (i) ∈ U δ i < ε concluding the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 2: At first, observe that f (s1, s2) ≥ 0 for (s1, s2) ∈ S attains a minimum in the interior of S. This is because S attains a compact closure, and f diverges on its boundary. By virtue of continuity f attains a minimum in its interior, let f be this minimum i.e., f = inf (s 1 ,s 2 )∈S f (s1, s2) > 0. This is a value that can be numerically approximated f ≈ 25.4603. Then for σ 2 i as in Theorem 2, we calculate:
T qj 2 f λjτ, βτ
||ei+1 − ei|| 2 due to the orthogonality of the vectors {qi} n i=1 .
Proof of Theorem 5:
The result follows directly after combining Theorems 1, 3, and Lemma 2.
Proof of Theorem 6: The proof directly follows from the eigenvalue restrictions dictated by the region S. Let λτ ∈ (0, π/2). Then βτ < f (a) for a to satisfy g(a) = λτ . In other words, βτ < (βτ ) * = f • g −1 (λτ ).
Inverting the last equality we obtain the limit λτ = g • f −1 ((βτ ) * ). For given β, τ such that βτ ∈ (0, 1) the limits are reversed so as to λτ < (λτ ) * = g • f −1 ((βτ )). The last condition has to be satisfied for all non-zero eigenvalues of L. The result then follows directly by elementary algebra.
Proof of Theorem 7: We will work the details for the systemic risk of vehicle collision only. Throughout the proof Rε = R C,i ε and σi = σ for notation simplicity. The steps to derive of the second trade-off condition is identical. From Theorem 3 we have
